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I. INTRODUCTION

Dean Kronman's lecture and subsequent essay, "Is Diversity a Value
in American Higher Education?" was meant to set forth a "new" legal
justification for affirmative action programs which take race into account
in college admissions and personnel hiring.' Dean Kronman's essay
provided a well-written and persuasive dissertation on the concept of
liberal education and the role that diversity of values may play in achieving
that liberal education. This Commentary generally assumes that
Affirmative Action programs have an important role in our present
society.2 In this light, this Commentary explains how Dean Kronman's
diversity argument, far from providing an alternative legal justification for
affirmative action, merely reiterates in modified language arguments
previously rejected by our nation's highest courts.
This Commentary will first briefly describe the background of the
Affirmative Action debate in order to properly frame Dean Kronman's
diversity argument. It will also explain the genesis of this argument and its
increasing importance as a legal justification for affirmative action. In so
doing, this analysis will set forth Dean Kronman's diversity argument as
a logical syllogism.3 Second, this Commentary will show how several

1. See Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in AmericanHigherEducation?,52 FLA.
L. REV, 861 (2000).

2. Affirmative Action is a subject which has the tendency to polarize its proponents and
opponents at extremely opposite poles. The author of this Commentary personally feels that
affirmative action programs, properly tailored and administered, play an important role in the social
well-being of our current American society. For a good debate pointing out some of the principal
arguments on both sides of the debate, see Dinesh D'Souza & Christopher Edley, Debate:
Affirmative Action Debate: Should Race-Based Affirmative Action Be Abandonedas a National
Policy, 60 ALB. L. REV. 425 (1996).
3. A syllogism "consists of three propositions (two premises and the conclusion), and these
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United States Supreme Court decisions belie the contention that the
diversity argument is a new, judicially-untested argument. Moreover, it
will demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court has already
essentially rejected the diversity argument. Finally, this Commentary will
suggest that if courts were to accept the diversity argument as an
alternative legal justification for affirmative action programs, our treasured
individual liberty would be greatly imperiled.
II. THE VALUE-DrVERSrrY RACE PROXY ARGUMENT
A. Backgroundto the DiversityArgument
1. Affirmative Action and Strict Scrutiny
Affirmative Action programs, generally speaking, have the goal of
increasing minority participation in various institutions, whether they be
schools, government, or business.4 In order to achieve this goal, these
programs must make decisions based on a person's race and/or ethnicity.
However, the Supreme Court, long ago, held that government decisionmaking based on race must be subjected to judicial strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'
Up to the present time, the only affirmative action justification to pass
the strict scrutiny standard has been the "remedial"justification.' Under the
contain three terms, of which the two occurring in the conclusion are brought together in the

premises by being referred to a common class." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (6th ed. 1991).
4. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 863 ("The common aim of [affirmative action] programs
[is] to increase the share of various social and economic goods-jobs, contracts, educational
opportunities and the like-that disadvantaged minorities enjoy, and thereby change the
background conditions that frustrate the achievement of racial justice.").
5. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to begin
with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."). Further, strict scrutiny applies to both "benign" and other
racial classifications. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224-25 (1995).
6. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,307-11 (1978) ("We have never
approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups
at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence ofjudicial, legislative, or administrative
findings ofconstitutional orstatutory violations."). However, as this commentary will later discuss,
in a concurring opinion in Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC,497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990), Justice

Stevens stated: 'Today the Court squarely rejects the proposition that a government decision that
rests on a racial classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong." Although
Metro Broadcasting certainly reads that way, it was a case involving the Court's temporary

flirtation with "rational basis" review of "benign" racial classifications. See id. at 564. Even if
Metro Broadcastinghad not been soon overruled by the Court in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v.

Pena,515 U.S. 200,227 (1995), the remedialjustification is still the onlyjustification that has ever
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remedial justification, affirmative action is used within an institution to
remedy past identified discrimination 7 within that particular institution.'
The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the use of the remedial
justification to uphold affirmative action programs that seek to rectify past
discrimination in society generally or even within a certain profession.9
2. Distributive Justice as a Justification for Affirmative Action
Lacking the requisite finding of institutional discrimination required to
use the remedial justification, affirmative action programs were justified
as promoting "distributive justice."'0 The distributive justice argument
essentially posits that members of certain minority groups have been
disadvantaged by the majority, and therefore opportunities should be
redistributed to the disfavored minorities at the expense of members of the
majority.' But, as Dean Kronman explains, the distributive justice
assumptions, both factual and
argument "required too many controversial
2
convincing."'
fully
be
ever
to
moral,

passed strict scrutiny.
7. In other words, a proponent of an affirmative action program based on the remedial
justification at a particular university, would have to prove that that particular university, as
opposed to universities in general or society, had illegally discriminated. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
307-08. In such a case, the remedial justification merely permits affirmative action to be used as a
remedy for the specific wrong perpetrated by that particular university. See id. Where the benefits
and burdens of such a program lie arguably blurs the line between this and distributive justice.
8. See id. at 307-11.
9. See id. at 307 (rejecting the use of the remedial justification to remedy societal
discrimination). The Bakke dissent unsuccessfully argued that the remedial justification was a
sufficient justification for affirmative action programs which sought to increase minority
representation in the medical profession. See id. at 355-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 864. "Distributive justice concerns obligations of the
community to the individual, and requires fair disbursement of common advantages and sharing of
common burdens." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (6th ed. 1991). Dean Kronman explains the
distributive justice argument as ajustification for affirmative action as follows:
Defenders of affirmative action replied that non-minority applicants are
themselves beneficiaries of the background conditions that maintain the system of
de facto segregation from which minority applicants suffer, and that their
ancestors (or some of them at least) helped to create these conditions in the first
place. This response was meant to make the conflict between minority and nonminority applicants look more like a contest of right against wrong, and less like
one of right against right.
Kronman, supra note 1, at 864.
11. Seeid. at863.
12. Id. at 864.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/3
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3. Hopwood v. Texas: A Rejection of Distributive Justice

When the distributive justice justification for affirmative action was
finally tested in Hopwood v. Texas,'3 that justification was resoundingly
rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 4 In
Hopwood, a "white" woman challenged the admissions policy of the
University of Texas School of Law after having her application rejected.' 5
She alleged that under the University's affirmative action program, the
University had admitted several minority students 16 with both
undergraduate GPA's and LSAT scores significantly lower than hers.' 7 She
alleged that such disparate8 treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.'
The District Court recognized "the proper constitutional standard under
which to evaluate the admissions program: strict scrutiny."1 9 The District
Court further explained that in order to pass strict scrutiny, a raceconscious program must "(1) serve a compelling government interest and
(2) [be] narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal."20 While the
District Court held that both the distributive justice and diversity
justifications passed strict scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit reversed this
holding. 2' Relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Circuit Court
held that neither distributive justice nor value-diversity (the topic of this
commentary) justifications could satisfy Equal Protection strict scrutiny.22
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiori.23
B. The Value-Diversity Race Proxy: A "New" Justificationfor
Affirmative Action
Dean Kronman points out that as the distributive justice argument was
rejected both in the courts and at the polls, a new legal justification was

13. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
14. See id. at 962; see also Kronman, supra note 1, at 867.
15. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
16.

See id. In this context, "minority" students refers to black students and American students

of Mexican heritage. ld.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

SeeMi.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 934.
See id. at 962. "In summary, we hold that the University of Texas School ofLaw may not

use race as a factorin deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student body,
to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the law

school's poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present effects of past
discrimination by actors other than the law school." Id.
23. See Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (denying certiori).
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needed for affirmative action programs-the value-diversity race proxy
justification. 24 Dean Kronman notes that this justification was first set forth
26 Dean
by Justice Powell, speaking for himself,2 in Bakke v. California.
Kronman explains the diversity argument as follows: "The claim that racial
and ethnic diversity is an educational good rests on two propositions: first,
that diversity of experience and values is [a valuable characteristic in the
school]; and second, that diversity of experience and values is strongly
linked to diversity of race and ethnicity."27 The argument concludes that an
institution should be allowed to admit or hire applicants based on race to
achieve the desired characteristic which race represents (e.g., valuediversity). This simple syllogism is laid out as such below.
The diversity argument is a "proxy" argument in that it would allow
educational institutions, seeking certain characteristics (i.e., value
diversity), to use race as a proxy for these characteristics because race is
"strongly linked" to these characteristics.28 Dean Kronman also refers to
this argument as the "internal argument" because it seeks to further the
internal mission of educating rather than address an external mission, such
as implementing distributive justice. 29 This commentary refers to this
argument as the "value-diversity race proxy" justification because it seeks
to allow race to be used as a proxy to achieve value diversity.

24. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 867.
25. "In short, there has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice
Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling
justification for government race-based discrimination. Subsequent Supreme Court case law
strongly suggests, in fact, that it is not." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945. At least one legal scholar has
opined that Justice Powell's statements in Bakke regarding diversity are binding Supreme Court
precedent. See Roscoe C. Howard, Getting it Wrong: Hopwood v. Texas and its Implicationsfor
Racial Diversityin LegalEducationand Practice,31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 831,833-34 (1997). The
Hopwood Court persuasively pointed out, however, that the word 'diversity' only appears in Justice
Powell's concurring opinion. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 ("While he announced the judgment,
no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale. In Bakke, the
word 'diversity' is mentioned nowhere except in Justice Powell's single-justice opinion."). Itis this
author's current understanding that while five justices did agree that race may be considered in the
admissions process, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272, only Justice
Powell suggested the value-"diversity" justification.
26. 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) ("The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment
of a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education.").
27. Kronman, supra note I, at 868 (emphasis added).
28. Dean Kronman also refers to his argument as a proxy argument: "And so long as this

remains true, the argument for treating racial and ethnic diversity as a means to or component of
or proxy for diversity of values can be supported by two claims." Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 865-66.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/3

6

Gregory: Diversity Is a Value in American Higher Education, But It Is Not
DIVERSITYINAMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

C. The Value-Diversity Race ProxyArgument as a Syllogism
Dean Kronman contemplated that the diversity argument might be
carried beyond the realm of academia (the specific subject of his essay) and
into such varied areas as police forces, fire fighting, etc.3 0 Therefore, this
commentary must lay out Dean Kronman's essential legal argument as a
legal syllogism applicable not only to the educational institution, but to the
wide range of institutions to which he referred. This syllogism takes the
following form:
Major Premise: Institutional experts know what personnel
characteristics would best contribute to the performance of
their institutional missions (e.g., universities have determined
that the characteristic of value-diversity is necessary in order
to accomplish their institutional mission of educating).
Minor Premise: Sometimes, race and ethnicity are so
"strongly linked" to these desired characteristics (e.g., valuediversity or savvy in dealing with ethnic populations) that race
and ethnicity are good proxies for these desired
characteristics.
Conclusion: Therefore, the institutional experts are legally
justified in considering race/ethnicity as a shortcut to achieve
the necessary personnel characteristics.
D. InstitutionalDeterminationof ImportantCharacteristic
As the Major Premise of the syllogism above makes clear, the proxy
argument requires that institutional experts have made a decision that a
particular characteristic is valuable. In the case of educational institutions,
30. See a at 866.
The distinction between internal and external goals is not a perfect one, but it is
crucial to understanding what is at stake in the diversity debate. Most, perhaps all,
activities have distinctive internal goals of their own. These are the specific ends
toward which the activities in question are directed. The activity of policing, for

example, aims to provide physical security for those living in a certain community.
The activity of firefighting is directed toward the prevention and control of fires.
These are the internal goals of policing and firefighting, respectively. They are
what the activities are designated for. If a police or fire department is required to
set aside a certain number of positions for minority applicants, who before have

been the victims of prejudice and discrimination in hiring, the resources of the
department are being used not in pursuit of its internal goal, but to help achieve
a fairer distribution of wealth and opportunities in society generally, a goal

external to the work of the department.
Id. at 865-66.
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Dean Kronman makes a compelling case that educational experts have
determined that value-diversity is a valuable characteristic.3
There exists a significant problem with judicial acceptance of the
institutional determination of the valued characteristic required under the
Major Premise. This problem stems from the lack of any safeguard to
preclude the race proxy from being used as a subterfuge for blatant racist
discrimination. For example, what if an institution merely asserted that a
particular characteristic is valuable, knowing that generally one race is
more likely to have that characteristic than another? For now, this
commentary accepts arguendo that institutions would simply not engage
in such subterfuge.32 Even assuming away racism and bad faith, just as
educational experts have made the value-diversity determination, some
other institutional experts could in good faith make the determination that
similarity of values (or some other characteristic) is more conducive to
their particular institutional mission.33
E. Quantum ofEvidence Required of Characteristic-ProxyLinkage
The MinorPremise of the proxy syllogism requires that race/ethnicity
be a good proxy for those characteristics that the institution desires of its
personnel. This begs the question, how strong must the proxy be, or rather,
to what degree does race/ethnicity have to correlate to the characteristic in
order for an institution to look to the race proxy rather than look for the
underlying characteristic itself?
Dean Kronman explains that race/ethnicity has to be "strongly linked"
to the underlying characteristic.34 He concludes that the value-diversity
race proxy satisfies this "strongly linked" standard.35 Therefore, to
determine what kind of evidence should be required of characteristic/race
proxy linkage, this commentary looks to the evidence Dean Kronman
found sufficient. A cursory listing of the evidence reveals its anecdotal
nature:

31. Over 9 pages of Dean Kronman's 34 page essay are devoted to proving the proposition

that diversity of values is a valuable and important characteristic in promoting a liberal education.
See id. at 868-877.
32. But see infra note 144 and'accompanying text.
33. In his essay, Dean Kronman makes the important point that higher academia used to
consider similarity of values a great asset, indeed even a goal, of the educational process. Kronman,
supra note 1, at 874. It seems plausible that an institution could determine that similarity of values

is indeed an asset for its particular internal mission. See DfNESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACISM
326-35 (The Free Press 1995). Judicial recognition of the value of diversity in the educational
environment might also support recognizing the importance of similarity of values in other

institutions.
34. Kronman, supra note 1, at 868.
35. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/3
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1. Blacks and whites are segregated residentially.36
2. Blacks and whites reacted to the O.J. Simpson verdict
differently.37
3. Black and white opinion was severely divided on the
Amadou Diallou shooting.3
4. "It also appears that blacks and whites differ... in their
assessment of the fairness with which capital punishment is
administered in the United States. 39
Dean Kronman goes on to explain that there exists "a wealth
of anecdotal evidence [suggesting] that race has a large
influence... on the judgments of whites and blacks .....
While these statements are persuasive and this commentary accepts
arguendo that they are all true, from an evidentiary standpoint, they are
arguably anecdotal. 41 Therefore, it appears that in Dean Kronman's view,
to use race as a "proxy" for a certain characteristic, the proxy's proponent
need only present anecdotal evidence of the characteristic-race proxy link.
IL. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF RACE PROXY
ARGUMENTS
A. Overview
Through his value-diversity race proxy argument, Dean Kronman
apparently hopes to satisfy strict scrutiny by positing that the
discrimination is not based on race, but rather on some underlying
characteristic for which race is a good proxy.42 This is not a new
argument.43 In defending race-based discrimination in the past, government
actors have often argued that they were only using race because of the
underlying characteristic which it represented.' With the value-diversity

36. See id at 879.
37. See idL
38. See id.

39. Id.
40. Id. 879-80.
41. An anecdote is a "short account of some interesting or humorous incident." THE
AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY 108 (2d ed. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1985) (1982).

42. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 883.
43. Dean Kronman, however, asserts that this is a "new"justification. Kronman, supra note
1, at 864 ("At this point, a new argument in defense of affirmative action appeared that had the

advantage of meeting both those objections at once." (emphasis added)).
44. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978) (examining

proxy argument).
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race proxy argument, the only new aspect is the specific language of the
proxy argument which has only recently come into popular usage.4'
Many lower federal courts have recently addressed the value-diversity
race proxy argument.46 This part consists of U.S. Supreme Court cases
which help to shed light on how that Court may decide the value-diversity
race proxy question. In the following three decisions, the Court does not
always refer to the word "proxy." Moreover, it is clear that with only one
exception, the Court's analysis unfailingly rejects the race proxy syllogism.
However, the Court does sometimes accept gender proxy, 7 age proxy, and

45. While the "proxy" language is relatively new, the Court has addressed "proxies" as such
on several occasions. See infra notes 47-49, 69 and accompanying text.
46. Many of these cases have come up in the context of elementary and high school
education. Most of these cases involved white plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions to block
a school's use of race-conscious admissions programs purportedly based on "diversity." One
element of a preliminary injunction is that the "plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the
merits." Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57,60-61 (D. Mass. 2000). Therefore,
these courts have often had to speculate as to whether diversity may pass strict scrutiny in order to
determine if the plaintiffs would ultimately be successful. The ComfortCourt, without deciding the
issue of whether diversity could pass strict scrutiny, see id. at 67, reversed the lower court's
granting of a preliminary injunction, see id. at 69. Another case, Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d
790, 800 (lst Cir. 1998), held that a diversity program which primarily focused on race and
ethnicity failed to meet even the requirements laid out by Justice Powell in Bakke. In Brewer v.
West IrondequoitCent.Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738,749 (2d Cir. 2000), the court reversed the district
court's granting of a preliminary injunction in part because the Second Circuit "has not previously
taken the position that diversity, or other non-remedial state interests, can never be compelling in
the educational setting." However, in Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub.Schs., 197 F.3d 123,
134 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction, yet refrained from addressing the merits of the diversity argument stating, "We have not
decided that the term diversity, as the term is used here, either is or is not a compelling
governmental interest." This was the same approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Tuttle v.
Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.denied, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000). Not
surprisingly considering Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit has recently reiterated that diversity is not a
compelling state interest for the purpose ofjustifying the use of racial preferences in admissions at
a public university. See Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213,221 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd on othergrounds
by Texas v. Lesage, 120 S. Ct. 467 (1999). See also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 56 (4th
Cir. 1992) (finding that a university scholarship program allegedly based on diversity was not in
fact based on diversity where the scholarship was only available for black students). But see Hunter
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1067 (1999) (holding that a laboratory school's use
of racial classifications to achieve a diverse student body met strict scrutiny).
47. See Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073 (1983). In Norris,the Court held that an annuity plan which provided lower benefits
to women than men solely on the basis of sex was a violation ofTitle VII. See id.at 1074. However,
in a concurring / dissenting opinion, several justices joined to explain that sex could be used as one
of many proxies to determine distribution of benefits. See id. at 1096-1108.
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mental-state proxy 4a arguments, at the minimum analyzing these types of
proxies under less than strict scrutiny.49
B. Korematsu v. United States:"0 Sadly, the Race Proxy Won
This commentary begins its look at Supreme Court precedent with the
one case in which the U.S. Supreme Court clearly and regrettably found
that a race proxy passed strict scrutiny.5' In the war-tom year of 1942, Fred
Korematsu, an American, was living with his family in California in the
family home. 2 Due to fear of enemy attack, the portion of California where
Korematsu lived was under the military command of General DeWitt.53
General DeWitt, no doubt an institutional expert in the military, made a
determination that all those persons likely to be involved in sabotage and
espionage activities should be removed from the area and held in
relocation camps.5 4 Based on this decision, General DeWitt issued an order
"which directed that ... all persons of Japanese ancestry should be
excluded from that area." 55 Mr. Korematsu refused to obey the order,
remained at home,5 6 and was subsequently charged and convicted for
violating the order.
Although the word "proxy" is nowhere mentioned in the decision, the
only civil conclusion is that General DeWitt believed that race (that is,
Japanese ancestry) was strongly linked to a propensity to commit
espionage and sabotage.57 Mr. Korematsu alleged that the application of
the order against "none but citizens of Japanese ancestry amounted to a

48. See generally City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The dissent
correctly characterized this as a proxy case: "Similarly, that some retarded people have reduced

capacities in some areas does not justify using retardation as a proxy for reduced capacity in areas
where relevant variations in capacity do exist." Id. at 468 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). The

Court's opinion only called for rational basis scrutiny of such proxies. Id. at 446. ('To withstand
equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others

must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.").
49. For another interesting proxy argument, see Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S.Ct. 1044, 1055
(2000) (explaining that "ancestry can be a proxy for race").
50. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 215.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 217.
55. Id. at 215.
56. See id.

57. One can make the argument here that no proxy, but mere racism, was involved in this
decision. In fact, the Korematsudissent makes just this point: "Such exclusion goes over 'the very
brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism." Id. at 233 (Murphy, J.,

dissenting). However, this merely goes to point out an incipient danger of proxies-a proxy can
easily be turned into a subterfuge. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally prohibited discrimination solely on account of race.""8 The
Supreme Court, in turn, addressed what this commentary has identified as
the two premises of the race proxy syllogism. First, it addressed the Major
Premiseby deferring to the military in its judgment regarding the dangers
of sabotage and espionage (that is, that persons with such characteristics
should be removed from the area).59 Second, it addressed the Minor
Premise by considering the strength of the proxy: "Approximately five
thousand American citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear
unqualified allegiance to the United States and to renounce allegiance to
the Japanese Emperor, and several thousand evacuees requested
repatriation to Japan."' 6 The dissent properly characterized this and other
evidence6' proffered by the United States as anecdotal and
unsubstantiated. 62 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found the military had
proved its case. Having found that the two premises were satisfied, the
Court concluded that race could be used as a proxy to remove persons who
presented a danger of espionage/sabotage.
The Court found that the military judgment regarding the link between
the sought-after characteristics (that is, propensity to commit espionage or
sabotage) and the race proxy were sufficient and therefore validated the
military's use of a race proxy. 63 The searching question though is why the
military could not mount an extensive inquiry and interview each
individual to determine if that individual possessed the sought-after
sabotage/espionage characteristics. The majority briefly brushed over this
point in deferring to the military's judgment of the existence of an
exigency.' The dissent asked this question in more forceful terms.65

58. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
59. See id. at 218.This is logically the same as an institution of higher learning determining

that persons with the value diversity characteristic should be admitted. It merely entails an
institutional decision regarding what characteristics are sought after or desirable.
60. Id. at 219.
61. See id. at 237-38 (Murphy, J.,dissenting) "Individuals of Japanese ancestry are
condemned because they are said to be a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to
an enemy nation by strong ties ofrace, culture, custom and religion ....
Japanese language schools
and allegedly pro-Japanese organizations are cited as evidence of possible group disloyalty, together
with facts as to certain persons being educated and residing at length in Japan." Id.

62. See id. at 236-37.
63. See id. at 223-24.
64. See id. at 218-19 ("It was because we could not reject the finding of the military
authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the

loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group.").
65. See id. at 241-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy stated:
No one denies, of course, that there were some disloyal persons of Japanese
descent on the Pacific Coast who did all in their power to aid their ancestral
land ....It seems incredible that under these circumstances it would have been
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Importantly, Dean Kronman does not address the issue as to why use the
proxy at all. Why not just look for the desired characteristic?
Later courts would characterize the Korematsu race proxy decision as
follows: "Justices of that Court and legal scholars have commented that the
decision is an anachronism in upholding overt racial discrimination as
'compellingly justified."'" It seems odd that in light of such
characterizations, the race proxy argument would again take on new life as
a justification for affirmative action.
C. United States v. Virginia: 67 Supreme CourtRejects a GenderProxy
In recent years, the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to
review gender proxies.6 ' Almost without fail, the Supreme Court has
rejected these gender proxies, even in cases where it appeared that the
gender proxy was "strongly linked" to the particular characteristic.69 The
recent Supreme Court decision striking down the male-only policy of the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is one such case.70
VMI is an old and venerable military college with a proud lineage of
successful graduates, both as servants of the nation and as leaders in
business and industry. 71 The VMI training program involves the use of an
"adversarial method," lack of privacy, and a harsh and very physically
demanding lifestyle.72 Until recently, VMI was also the sole male-only
state-supported college in Virginia.73

impossible to hold loyalty hearings for the mere 112,000 persons involved-or at
least for the 70,000 American citizens-especially when a large part of this
number represented children and elderly men and women.
Id. (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
66. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
67. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
68. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,202 (1991) (rejecting sex as a proxy
for strength even if it is generally a good proxy); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (rejecting sex as a proxy for need for child
support even if there exists a statistically significant link); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
69. See, e.g., UAW, 499 U.S. at 202 ("We also required in Dothard a high correlation
between sex and ability to perform job functions and refused to allow employers to use sex as a
proxyfor strengthalthoughit might be afairlyaccurateone." (emphasis added)); Craig,429 U.S.
at 204 ("Suffice to say that the showing offered by the appellees does not satisfy us that sex
represents a legitimate,accurateproxy for the regulation of drinking and driving." (emphasis
added)); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,688 (1973) (holding that a proxy of family member
dependency on the male, but not on the female was invalid in the armed forces).
70. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515.
71. See id. at 521-22.
72. Id. at 522.
73. See id. at 520.
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During recent litigation challenging its male-only policy, VMI argued
and proferred expert-created reports to "prove" that generally speaking, the
VMI system was more appropriate for the training of men than women. 4
Further, VMI presented "proof' that men were better able to endure the
physical challenges of VMI life than women.7 Although the word "proxy"
does not appear in the decision, this is nothing more than a proxy
argument. The argument contains all the syllogistic essentials: the expertdetermined institutionally valuable characteristic (MajorPremise), the
"strong link" between gender (the proxy) and the desired characteristics
(MinorPremise),77 and the use of the gender-proxy to achieve the desired
characteristics (Conclusion).78
Justice Ginsburg's response to the proxy presented in the VM1 case
provides a very succinct answer to the value-diversity race proxy
syllogism:
The United States does not challenge any expert witness
estimation on average capacities or preferences of men and
women. Instead, the United States emphasizes that time and
again since this Court's turning point decision in Reed v.
Reed.... we have cautioned reviewing courts to take a "hard
look" at generalizations or "tendencies" of the kind pressed
by Virginia, and relied upon by the District Court .... State
actors controlling gates to opportunity, we have instructed,
may not exclude qualified individuals based on "fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females." ...
[SJee J.E.B. (equal protection principles, as applied to gender

74. See id.at 523.
75. Justice Ginsburg explained:

In support of its initial judgment for Virginia, a judgment rejecting all equal
protection objections presented by the United States, the District Court made
"findings" on "gender-based developmental differences.". . . These "findings"
restate the opinions of Virginia's expert witnesses, opinions about typically male
or typically female "tendencies." . . . For example, "males tend to need an
atmosphere of adversativeness," while "females tend to thrive in a cooperative
atmosphere." "I'm not saying that some women don't do well under [the]
adversative model," VMI's expert on educational institutions testified,
"undoubtedly there are some [women] who do"; but educational experiences must
be designed "around the rule," this expert maintained, and not "around the
exception."

Id. (citations omitted).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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classifications, mean state actors may not rely on "overbroad"
generalizations...).7 9

It is indeed telling that the United States did not even feel it necessary
to challenge Virginia's proof of the "proxy" link (i.e., the "estimation on
average capacities or preferences" of men and women). 80 It was not
necessary for the United States to challenge the strength of the proxy itself
because, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, the accuracy of the proxy does
not matter: even if the character-proxy link is generally accepted and most
women would not do well in the VIl environment, there exist women
who could meet the physical requirements.8 In other words, so long as
there exist people who fall outside of the proxy, the gender proxy cannot
be used in making admissions decisions. The race proxy argument, while
internally coherent and persuasive, cannot be used because its cost on the
individual and society is too great. So held Justice Ginsburg despite the
undisputed fact that VMI admissions personnel were the experts in the
field, and the characteristic/gender proxy link was not even challenged.
The issue before the VMI Court was a gender-based proxy. Indeed, the
constitutional standard for gender-based discrimination is only that the
state have an "exceedingly persuasive" justification. 82 Even though the
proxy was not challenged, the Court did not allow the proxy to substitute
for an actual inquiry into whether or not a particular woman would succeed

79. Id. at 541-42.
80. Id. at 540-41.
81. Justice Ginsburg explained:
The District Court forecast from expert witness testimony, and the Court of

Appeals accepted, that coeducation would materially affect "at least these three
aspects of VMI's program-physical training, the absence of privacy, and the

adversative approach."... And it is uncontested that women's admission would
require accommodations, primarily in arranging housing assignments and physical
training programs for female cadets.... It is also undisputed, however, that "the
VMI methodology could be used to educate women."... The District Court even
allowed that some women may prefer it to the methodology a women's college

might pursue. "Some women, at least, would want to attend [VMI] if they had the
opportunity," the District Court recognized.... and "some women," the expert
testimony established, "are capable of all of the individual activities required of
VMI cadets".... The parties, furthermore, agree that "some women can meet the
physical standards [VMI] now impose[s] on men." ... In sum, as the Court of
Appeals stated, "neither the goal of producing citizen soldiers," VMI's raison

d'etre, "nor VMIs implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women."
Id. (citations omitted).
82. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
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at VMII. 3 The detailed reports provided by the experts in the VMI case
failed to satisfy even this less stringent standard. In the case of government
discrimination based on race, the U.S. Supreme Court has continually
applied strict scrutiny, not this lesser intermediate scrutiny ("exceedingly
persuasive") standard. In light of this decision, it is difficult to see how any
race proxy could pass muster.
VMI, whose admissions system arguably represented an extreme use of
a proxy,' argued that it was not "stereotyping" women.8" Indeed, a
"stereotype" is merely a synonym for a weak characteristic / proxy link. In
this sense, whenever an assumption about a group is called a "stereotype,"
a conclusory judgment is being drawn as to the strength of the proxy.86 In
fact, viewed this way, the proxy argument is not new at all. The VMI case
also shows that the proxy argument has already been rejected by this
nation's highest court, having failed to satisfy a standard even lower than
the strict scrutiny it would face as a race proxy.
D. Batson v. Kentucky: 87 Supreme CourtRejects a Race Proxy
Batson involved a criminal trial in a Kentucky state court of a black
man.8 The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four
black persons from the jury, and an all white jury was selected.8 9 Here, the
prosecutor used race as a proxy for perceived biases and beliefs of the
black prospective jurors. 90 Defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor's

83. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
84. The VMI case was "extreme" because the proxy argument completely precluded women
from attending the college. See id. at 520.
85. Id. at 549. A "stereotype" is a "conventional, formulaic, and usually oversimplified
HERrrAGE DICTIONARY 1195 (2d ed. Houghton
conception, opinion, or belief." THE AmIc.'c
Mifflin Co. 1985). By the terms of the race proxy syllogism, a "proxy" based on race/ethnicity is

merely the contention that a race is so "strongly linked" to a particular characteristic that race can
be used as a stand in for that characteristic. In this sense, use of a race proxy can be viewed as a
form of super-stereotyping. "Virginia maintain[ed] that these methodological differences are
'justified pedagogically,' based on 'important differences between men and women in learning and
developmental needs,' 'psychological and sociological differences' Virginia describes as 'real' and
'not stereotypes."' Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 28). The above
quotation makes it fairly clear that in denying that it was merely "stereotyping" women, VMI was
arguing that it had a strong characteristic-gender proxy link.
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
88. See id. at 82.

89. See id. at 83.
90. See id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or occupation, as a "proxy" for

potential juror partiality, based on the assumption or belief that members of one
group are more likely to favor defendants who belong to the same group, has long
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actions violated petitioner's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 9'
The Supreme Court noted that "competence to serve as a juror
ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and
ability impartially to consider evidence as presented at trial."' Further, the
Court conceded that "a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise
permitted peremptory challenges for any reason at all, as long as that
reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of the case to be
tried." 93 Although the Court recognized that the prosecutor is entitled "for
any reason at all" to exclude jurors, the Court specifically stated: "The
Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a
group will be
unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black
94
defendant.
One element of Dean Kronman's anecdotal proof that race is a good
proxy for value diversity is that blacks and whites reacted to the O.J.
Simpson verdict differently.95 He also posited that "blacks and whites
differ, to a statistically impressive degree, in their assessment of the
fairness with which capital punishment is administered in the United
States.,96 In light of this assertion, consider that during voir-dire, a
prosecutor can freely question a prospective juror. After the voir-dire, the
prosecutor can certainly determine that aparticularjuror held the foregoing
views which Dean Kronman alleges are "strongly linked" to race. 97 Clearly,
the prosecutor could rightfully strike this particular juror from the panel as
biased. Afortiori, if one accepts the value-diversity proxy syllogism with
the "strong link" between viewpoint and race, why should a prosecutor be
precluded from using race as a proxy for the same views?
been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of peremptory
challenges.
Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J.dissenting).
91. See id. at 83.

92. Id. at 87.
93. Id. at 89 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (Conn. 1976)).
94. Id.

95. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 879.
96. Id.

97. For instance, if after questioning the jurors in a death penalty, the prosecutor felt that
certain prospective jurors held the view that the death penalty was inherently unfair, he could strike
those people from the jury. The same is true if the prosecutor believed those individuals thought
the criminal justice system was unfair. Dean Kronman asserts that these group views and values are
so "strongly linked" that admissions personnel should look merely to race. Id. at 879.Afortiori,the
state's interest in a fair trial would seem to compel the same conclusion in the prosecutor's selection
of an unbiased jury. Such a use might also be considered "benign." See infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
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The Batson Court clearly held that a prosecutor cannot use race as the
proxy.9" The Batson case makes it clear that a prosecutor during jury
selection could never take notice of Dean Kronman's assertion that:
[T]he correlation between being white, on the one hand, and
black or Hispanic on the other, and holding a certain set of
beliefs about issues of moral and political importance-about
the honesty of the police, the fairness of the courts, the
openness of the world of work to
99 all with energy and
talent-is bound to be a strong one.
It is true that the use of race proxies may increase efficiency because
they allow the proxy proponent to eliminate large groups of people without
having to make individualized reviews. In fact, proponents of race proxies
would find a compelling argument in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Batson: "Indeed, given the need for rdasonable limitations on the time
devoted to voir dire, the use of such [race] 'proxies' by both the State and
the defendant may be extremely useful in eliminating from thejury persons
who might be biased in one way or another."' °

E. Conclusionfor Supreme CourtTreatment of Proxies
This section has showed that the Supreme Court has generally treated
proxies negatively, even at standards lower than strict scrutiny. Therefore,
proponents of race proxy arguments, such as the value-diversity argument,
are left in the awkward position of having to argue the persuasive value of
Korematsu and Justice Rehnquist's Batsondissent. This is not an enviable
position. As one Federal district court recently explained, "[T]oday, the
decision in Korematsu lies overruled in the court of history." ''
IV. THE DANGEROUS RACE PROXY SYLLoGISM: A HYPOTHETICAL
Dean Kronman highlights in his essay that while race is a good proxy
for diversity of values, it is only a "contingent" one at best.'0 2 Based solely

98. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,89 (1986).
99. Kronman, supra note 1, at 880.

100. Batson, 476 U.S. at 138-39 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
101. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
102. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 885. Dean Kronman explains:

Diversity of values is permanently tied to the ends of liberal learning. Diversity of
race and ethnicity is strongly but only contingently tied to these same ends, and
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on this proxy, the value-diversity race proxy argument would justify an
institution's choice between two candidates based on the candidate's race
(serving as a proxy) without any inquiry as to whether the candidate does
indeed possess the desired characteristics. The race proxy argument works
best, and is least abhorrent in the contemporary environment of higher
education, where experts have determined that diversity of values is an
asset. 3 But, the race proxy argument could find application elsewhere.
Putting aside the distinction between government and private
discrimination, consider a hypothetical conservative Atlanta law firm
whose clients are 99% "white" businessmen. No doubt the senior partners
of this law firm would be those best qualified to determine the proper mix
of associates in their firm. Suppose that these institutional experts
determined that they needed individuals with similar values in their law
firm, values they perceived to be shared with their clients.'0 4 Indeed,
studies of large Japanese firms have shown that similarity of values might
even be a greater asset than value diversity.105 Assume also that these
partners expend valuable time every year reviewing numerous employment
applications. These partners would certainly like a more efficient method
of sorting through applications.
According to the value-diversity race proxy argument, the partners
should be able to summarily reject all black applicants if being black is
generally a good proxy for holding values and judgments different from
those sought after. Alternatively, black applicants could be rejected for not
knowing how to interact with white clients.'6 The firm could answer any

the failure to keep this distinction in view is likely to produce a confused
conception of the aims of liberal education generally.
Id.
103. See id. at 871-77.

104. By making this asserting part of the hypothetical, the hypothetical not only addresses race
proxies generally, but the instant race proxy as well, the value-diversity race proxy.
105. See DONWSH D'SOUZA, THE END OFRAcISM 334 (1996).
106. Dean Kronman hypothesized that "a police department is better able to provide physical
security to the residents of a mostly black neighborhood if it hires more African-Americans (on the
reasonable assumption that a racially mixed police force will present a better image to, and have
more authority within, the neighborhood in question)." Kronman, supra note 1, at 885-86. At first
blush, it may sound antiquated to argue by analogy then that white attorneys would "present abetter
image to, and have more authority with" their white clientele. In fact, a civil society would look

down on such a clientele as closed-minded and racist. In this light, it seems quite surprising to
hypothesize that a majority black neighborhood would somehow be so closed-minded as to only
accept a black police force. There are a couple of interesting cases addressing diversity within
police forces. In Hayes v. City of Charlotte, 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit

affirmed a partial summary judgment for a group of white police officers who brought suit
challenging the police department's use of racial preferences in the promotion process:
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discrimination charges by merely running through the value-diversity race
proxy syllogism: we did not discriminate based on race, but rather upon the
underlying characteristics (Major Premise) for which race serves as a
proxy (MinorPremise). Indeed, proponents of value-diversity could not
even argue the weakness of this proxy because their own argument
requires merely anecdotal evidence of a proxy connection. Of course, if the
partners passed upon some qualified attorneys along the way (i.e., people
for whom race was not an accurate proxy for values), that is the price of
efficiency, so long as the proxy is "strongly linked" to the sought-after
characteristic.
The proxy argument can be extended anywhere' 07-- perhaps, if the
institutional judgments were correct and the proxies were researched in
good faith, the institution could perform its internal mission better, but the
cost to the individual would be too great. This is precisely why the
Supreme Court has almost unfailingly'0 8 required a "compelling
governmental interest" before the state may discriminate based upon
race.' 09 As the following discussion on "racial profiling" shows, race
proxies exact an immeasurable cost on society in other ways as well.
V. A CURRENT USE OF RACE PROXIES: RACIAL-PROFILING BY POLICE
There has been much discussion recently about "racial profiling" by
police. 10 "Racial profiling" involves the police developing a physical

Without deciding whether achieving a greater racial diversity'within the police
department is a compelling state interest that might justify awarding promotions
on the basis of race, when not directed at past discrimination, we agree with the
district court that the evidence offered by the City to establish the benefits of such
diversity is not sufficient to create the genuine issue of material fact necessary to
survive summary judgment.
Id. at 213; see also Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202,206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that
diversity is not a compelling state interest for purposes ofjustifying an affirmative action program
in police cadet admissions).
107. For example, the proxy argument could be extended to public high schools as well. In the
recent rash of school shootings, perhaps educational experts could come up with the perfect profile
ofaschool shooter: certain GPA, lack ofextra-curricular activities, white, male. Perhaps, they could
even provide numbers that proved the statistical significance of this proxy such that it was even
more plausible than the anecdotal race-values proxy. Certainly, if the vague and amorphous
diversity of values argument justifies trumping individual rights, then this situation involving school
safety should provide an even more compelling justification than value-diversity.
108. There was a brief period in which the Court experimented with a lower level of scrutiny
for "benign" racial classifications. See infra,Part VI (discussing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
109. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
110. See Steve Strunsky, A Weariness on the Street, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2000, at 6(2)

(explaining some of the outrage behind racial profiling).
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profile of a criminal (i.e., what a criminal "looks like" such as dress,
location, and importantly, race) and then carefully watching or stopping
people who meet that profile."' The profiling of criminals generally has a
fairly long history.' "The Supreme Court has never expressly approved
or disapproved the use of such profiles."' 3 Police officers who use racial
profiling would no doubt justify their use based on these officers'
extensive experience. Perhaps they would say, "We have arrested
thousands of drug pushers, so we know what they 'look' like, including
race. In fact, 75% of the time our suspicions are correct." Hypothesize for
the moment that a study exists, based on arrest records, which proves that
the officers' "racial profile" is 89%1 4 accurate (to exceed the anecdotal
threshold of the value-diversity race proxy argument).
The "racial profiling" argument set forth above would meet each
premise of the proxy syllogism so that race may serve as a proxy for the
underlying characteristic (criminal drug possession). Here is the argument
placed squarely in the syllogism:
Major Premise. Police have determined that they should
arrest people who possess illegal drugs.
MinorPremise:Based both on studies (our hypothetical) and
on their own observations (anecdotal evidence), 89% of
people who dress a certain way, loiter in a certain location,
and, the clincher, are of a certain race, possess illegal drugs.
In other words, these characteristics are "strongly linked" to
drug possession.
Conclusion:Therefore, the police are justified in-using race
(along with the other profile characteristics) to pay increased
attention (e.g., "citizen's encounters"1 5 ) to these persons.
The syllogism may sound plausible, but before accepting racial
profiling, we should go back and consider why there has recently been so

111. See id.
112. See CHRIS TOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE
INVESTIGATION 156-58 (2nd ed. (1998)). Professor Slobogin notes the early success of a"hijacker
profile." Id. He also notes the success of the "drug courier profile." Id.
113. Id. at 157.
114. This number is completely hypothetical. The author chose a relatively high correlation
to show that no matter how "strongly linked" the characteristic is, the cost on society is still too
great.
115. A"citizen's encounter" is a level of police-citizen interaction much lower than an arrest,
and even lower than a stop. An arrest requires probable cause and a stop requires reasonable
suspicion. However, a "citizen's encounter" does not even require reasonable suspicion. A
"citizen's encounter" may even be entirely random. See Pritchett v. State, 677 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1996) (holding that vague tip based on race was not adequate to justify officer's raising the
level of stop from a citizen's encounter to an investigatory stop).
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much outrage over it."16 Speaking of criminal profiling generally, Professor
Slobogin states that "if a profile is proven to show the requisite correlation
with crime, and it is clear that the profile was actually used by police in
deciding to act, rather than made up afterward, then its use should not be
prohibited."'1 7 The foregoing statement merely recognizes the increased
efficiency which flows from using proxies. However, Professor Slobogin' s
specific response to criminal profiling using race as a proxy is starkly
different:
These stops should not be permitted, even in the unlikely
event the aforementioned percentage rose to the level
necessary to authorize a stop [i.e., the proxy was really
accurate] (which, in addition to infringing the autonomy
interest, involves the stigmatization associated with being
singled out on the public street by the police, as well as the
possibility of perceived harassment)." 8
The argument is simply that even if the character-race proxy is good
119
and increases the ability of the police to perform its "internal mission"
of suppressing crime, the use of "factors such as race denigrates the state's
interest in maintaining a democratic society and the allegiance of the
population."' 20 The societal costs of using race as a proxy are simply too
great.
Racial profiling is generally against the fabric of our nation's character
and history where a person should be judged by his government based on
his individual merits and not based on perceived or "strongly linked" group
propensities.
VI. REFqINNG DEAN KRONMAN'S PROPOSALS
A. Dean Kronman'sProposals
Dean Kronman suggested two developments to aid his position. He
proposed "a national reaffirmation of our commitment to affirmative action
as an instrument of distributive justice and the validation of this
commitment in our courts."'' In addition, Dean Kronman proposed that

116. See Strunsky, supra note 110.
117. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a FourthAmendment, 39 UCLAL. REv. 1,82

(1991).
118. Id. at 85-86.
119. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 865-66 (explaining the distinction and overlap between

internal and external missions).
120. Slobogin, supra note 117, at 82.
121. Kronman, supra note 1, at 895.
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"there would be explicit recognition, by the Supreme Court of the United
States, of the constitutionality of using race-sensitive admissions programs
to promote the internal educational good of diversity."' 122
This first proposal argues that Hopwood was wrong and that
distributive justice is a compelling justification for government race-based
discrimination. As Dean Kronman stated early in his essay, distributive
justice requires "too many controversial assumptions, both factual and
moral, to ever be fully convincing."'2" Therefore, this commentary leaves
the distributive justice proposal at that, an amorphous argument with little
hope of a reconciliation of views.
As to the second proposal, there seems to be more potential for
consensus. Validation of the value-diversity race proxy argument by the
U.S. Supreme Court could come about in either one or both of two ways.
12 4
First, the U.S. Supreme Court could hold that this particular race proxy
meets the strict scrutiny standard. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could
hold that the value-diversity race proxy is only required to meet some
lower level of review and that it does indeed meet that level.
Dean Kronman does not suggest which of these two approaches is
preferable or if a combination of both would be ideal. Based on Supreme
Court decisions discussed in this commentary, it seems that the valuediversity race proxy could never meet strict scrutiny so long as such
scrutiny remained strict in fact. " This commentary has already shown the
danger of removing strict scrutiny review, especially where other more
distasteful proxies may be statistically more valid than the vague and
amorphous value-diversity proxy. In fact, Korematsuprovides an excellent
example of the mischief judicial proxies can cause when strict scrutiny is
not strict in fact.'26 Now, this commentary turns to the second of the two
possibilities, that of a lower standard of review for the value-diversityrace
proxy, instead of for all race proxies in general.
122. Id.
123. Il at 864.

124. Specifically the value-diversity race proxy, considered as a separate argument from race
proxies in general.
125. Indeed, Korematsuis the only 20th Century Supreme Court case this author was able to
locate where the Court found that a race proxy did in fact meet strict scrutiny. Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214,223 (1944).
126. No doubt many people of the time believed the Japanese ancestry-espionage proxy to be
fairly persuasive, especially in a time of war. In England, the government, rather than use a proxy,
interviewed each and every citizen of close German or Italian ancestry to determine their threat to

the country. America, however, relied on the race proxy. In England, very few English subjects of
Italian or German ancestry were incarcerated after the interviews, whereas in America, the entire
West coast Japanese-American population was interned. The race proxy left the individual out of
the formula, and is forever a bleak spot on our American history. It would take nearly forty years
for a follow-up Korematsu case to judicially acknowledge this error. See Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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B. A More Refined Proposal:A Lower Standardfor Benign
Discrimination
In Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC,127 the Supreme Court allowed a
lower standard of review for "benign" racial classifications. 28 Under this
approach, if the value-diversity race proxy were labeled "benign," it would
need only pass rational basis scrutiny. This approach is not without
problems, though, such as the definition of "benign" and who should be
allowed to make this determination.' 29 This was the primary reason the
Court reversed itself only five years later in Adarand Constructors,Inc. v.
Pena,130 and reaffirmed its131earlier position that all racial classifications are
subject to strict scrutiny.
Although the AdarandCourt emphatically ruled out this use of a dual
standard towards race proxies, it seems to present less problems than the
127. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
128. Id. at 564-65. Metro Broadcastinginvolved a suit by several plaintiffs challenging the
validity of programs for distribution of broadcast licences administered by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). See id. at 553. The plaintiffs alleged that these programs
unlawfully discriminated against non-minorities because theygave special consideration to minority
applicants. See id. at 597. The FCC defended its programs on the grounds that such programs were
necessary to increase diversity of viewpoint over the broadcast airwaves. See id. at 552-54. Clearly,
this is a proxy argument in that the FCC alleged that increasing diversity of race in ownership of
broadcast licenses would increase diversity of programming.
129. The designation of a racial classification (herein read race proxy) as "benign" is largely
subjective. Presumably "benign" is determined by the intention of the proxy proponent and would
no doubt involve some type of cost/benefit analysis. For the value-diversity race proxy, the
proponent would argue that the benefit is great: increasing diversity ofvalues within the educational
institution. He would further argue that the cost is slight: only those few "white" individuals who
would have been admitted "but for" affirmative action paid any price. Therefore, the proponent
would conclude that such a race proxy is "benign." The problem is that one could use the same
reasoning to conclude that racial profiling by police is "benign." Police do not have time to stop
everyone in the neighborhood. Perhaps the police are dealing with a relatively accurate proxy. The
benefit is clear-safe streets for the kids to play. The cost, one might argue, is only imposed on those
unfortunate individuals for whom the proxy was not accurate. So long as there are benefits, and
those benefits are spread widely (as in both value diversity and neighborhood safety), and costs
which are concentrated narrowly (one white applicant or a few unfortunate innocent motorists), it
seems there can never be an objectively "benign" racial proxy.
130. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
131. See id. at 227.
[We hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state,
or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. To the
extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled.
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other proposition13 2 set forth by Dean Kronman. Indeed, had Metro

Broadcastingnot been overruled, there would be no question that benign
33
race proxies (e.g., the value-diversity race proxy), would be permissible.1
VII. A JUSTIFICATION MADE FOR LITIGATION:
SUBTERFUGE IS USUALLY A BAD THING

This commentary has demonstrated that race proxies have a lackluster
judicial track record. Further, the thin line between a "strongly linked" race
proxy and a stereotype necessarily makes civil people feel uncomfortable.
As such, this commentary will now explore how it is that a race proxy is
currently being held up as the only justification of affirmative action. l"
It is appropriate to start this discussion with a passage from Oliver
Wendell Holmes:
The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and
ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be
accounted for. Some ground of policy is thought of, which
seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of
things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons
which have been found for it, and enters on a new career ....

132. The recognition of "distributive justice" as a legal justification for affirmative action.
133. The Metro Broadcasting decision is exactly the type of approval Dean Kronman is
seeking from the Supreme Court when he proposes: "Ihe first would be an explicit recognition, by
the Supreme Court of the United States, of the constitutionality of using race-sensitive admissions
programs to promote the internal educational good of diversity." Kronman, supra note 1, at 895.
In Metro Broadcasting,a majority of the Court specifically stated:
We hold that... race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those
measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate victims
of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible
to the extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power
of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives ....
We hold that the FCC minority ownership policies pass muster under the test we
announce today. First, we find that they serve the important governmental
objective of broadcast diversity. Second, we conclude that they are substantially
related to the achievement of that objective.
Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 564-66.
134. During his lecture, Dean Kronman pointed out that the value-diversity race proxy
argument is the sole argument being relied upon by the University of Michigan in their current suit
to defend their affirmative action program. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich.
1998), rev'dby Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Anthony T. Kronman,
2000 Distinguished Dunwody Lecture: Is Diversity in HigherEducation a Value? (April 2000)
(transcript on file with the Florida Law Review).
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illustrates this course of
The subject under1 consideration
35
events very clearly.
In the above passage, Holmes explains how a remedy may take on a
life of its own, beyond the original justification for which it was created.136
Dean Kronnan agrees that affirmative action, which also started out as a
remedy, followed this sort of sequence: the perceived problem of unequal
distribution of opportunities lead to the creation of the affirmative action
remedy.' 37 Once the distributive justice justification failed, affirmative
action was left as a remedy without any legal justification. 3 ' Seeking to
preserve the remedy, affirmative action proponents came up with the
value-diversity race proxyjustification. 39 In more eloquent words, "[s]ome
[affirmative
ground of policy [was] thought of, which 'seem[ed] to explain
''' 4
action] and to reconcile it with the present state of things. 9 0
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Ginsburg, has expressed
disapproval of such justifications specifically manufactured for litigation:
"The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc

135. OLIVERW. HOLvI,THECOMMONLAW5 (Dover Publications 1991) (1881) (discussing
early forms of liability).
136. See id.
137. Kronman, supra note 1, at 863.
The Common aim of these programs [Affirmative Action] was to increase the
share of various social and economic goods--jobs, contracts, educational
opportunities and the like-that disadvantaged minorities enjoy, and thereby
change the background conditions that frustrate the achievement of racial
justice .... [A]ffirmative action is essentially a program of redistribution whose
goal is to increase the wealth and opportunities that disadvantaged groups
possess ....
Id.
138. See id. at 867 ("In recent years, moreover, the appeal of the diversity argument has grown
as the defense of affirmative action on external grounds has been rejected in the courts and
repudiated at the polls.").
139. If affirmative action were asincere remedy for a deficit ofvalue diversity, one would have
expected to see the following phenomenon: Due to a deficit of value diversity, a university would
have invented the remedy of race-conscious affirmative action. Neither Dean Kronman nor other
supporters of value-diversity race proxies purport this to be so. Rather, value diversity proponents
readily admit affirmative action came before the diversity justification, and that the race proxy
justification had its inception with Justice Powell's comments in Bakke. See Kronman, supra note
1, at 864-65 (explaining that this "new argument, emphasized by Justice Powell in his concurring
opinion in the Bakke case, advanced a simple and attractive claim: that the presence of minority
students in significant numbers is itself vital to the success of the educational enterprise in which
colleges and universities are engaged").
140. The portion in quotations is borrowed, out of context, from Justice Holmes' seminal
work. See HOLMES, supra note 135, at 5.
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in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences .... "141
This phenomenon of thejustification coming after the remedy may help
to explain judicial hostility towards the value-diversity race proxy
justification.'42 Even more to the point, this phenomenon explains the
demonstrated ill-fit of the use of a race proxy as the justification for the
progressive notion of affirmative action.' Indeed, this is because the
value-diversity race proxy has existed, from its inception, as nothing more
than a subterfuge for other judicially-rejected justifications. 44
VIII. CONCLUSION

While accepting that diversity of values is essential to a liberal
education, this commentary has demonstrated that the value-diversity race
proxy argument will fail as ajustification for affirmative action. Analogous
race proxies have already been rejected by the Supreme Court. In addition,
the societal costs of recognizing "race proxies" are simply too great.
Judicial recognition of the value-diversity race proxy justification would,
as shown throughout this commentary, imperil our right to be judged as
individuals, the one unquestioned legacy of our nation's founding.

141. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
142. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-48 (expressing disapproval of the valuediversity race proxy).
143. It also helps to explain why affirmative action supporters would latch onto the concept
of a proxy, instead of seeking out value diversity by way of individual inquiries. The Hopwood
Court makes this point:
Instead, individuals, with their own conceptions of life, further diversity of
viewpoint. Plaintiff Hopwood is a fair example of an applicant with a unique
background. She is the now-thirty-two-year-old wife of a member of the Armed
Forces stationed in San Antonio and, more significantly, is raising a severely
handicapped child.... We do not opine on which way the law school should
weigh Hopwood's qualifications; we only observe that "diversity" can take many
forms. To foster such diversity, state universities and law schools and other
governmental entities must scrutinize applicants individually, rather than
resortingto the dangerousproxy of race.
Id. at 946-47 (emphasis added).
144. During the question-answer period of Dean Kronman's lecture, one professor noted the
similarity in results achieved through programs based on strict quotas (distributive justice) and the
value-diversity race proxy justification. The professor posited that this seemed to indicate that the
race proxy argument is a mere "subterfuge" argument to placate the courts in light of the failure of
the distributive justice argument. Dean Kronman replied, "Sometimes, subterfuge is a good thing."
See Author's Original Notes of Dean Kronman's Lecture. While it is true that "sometimes
subterfuge is a good thing," as this commentary has shown, most of the time, it is not.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2000], Art. 3

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/3

28

